

## VENICE: THE BALKAN POLICY OF HUNGARY AND THE RISE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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In the second half of the fifteenth century, in addition to the century-old rivalry with Genoa, the policy of Venice in Romania was influenced by two factors: the rise of Hungary in the time of the Angevine dynasty and the Ottoman expansion in Europe. In a few decades, the presence of these two powers in the central and South-Eastern European space altered the power balance established at the end of the Genoese-Venetian war of 1350–1355 in such a considerable way that, at the outbreak of the “war of Tenedos” (1377–1381), Venice found herself in a position obviously inferior to the one held by the middle of the century.

### **1. The Hungarian issue and the question of the Hungarian-Genoese alliance in the Venetian politics**

A recent study has put into light the critical mutations in the Venetian-Genoese relations in the period between the Bosphorus war and the Chioggia war.<sup>1</sup> The main threat to the Venetian interests in the period was the Genoese-Hungarian collusion aiming to isolate Venice and, eventually, to eliminate it as a political and commercial power. This project was launched almost simultaneously with the occupation of the northern area of the Black Sea littoral by the Genoese, and of the Dalmatian coast by Louis of Anjou. The achievement of these targets was prone to set the stage for a clear-cut isolation of Venice. Indeed, the new axes for trade linking the Black Sea to the Adriatic, thought out by the King of Hungary, shunned the city of the lagoons. A commercial blockade and the elimination of Venice as a commercial power was to follow in a last stage.

At first sight, this project seems extremely simply to achieve. In reality, the evolution of the international situation in Central and South-Eastern Europe was much more complicated. The relations between the two main adversaries of Venice – Genoa and Hungary – had several dark areas (one may ask why the Genoese did not use the Wallachian road linking the Genoese Kilia to Buda *via*

<sup>1</sup> Șerban Papacostea, *De la guerre du Bosphore à la guerre de Tenedos: rivalités commerciales et alignements politiques dans le Sud-Est de l'Europe dans la seconde moitié du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, in *Coloniser au Moyen Age* sous la direction de Michel Balard et Alain Ducellier, Paris, 1995, pp. 341–352.

Braşov)<sup>2</sup> and they were influenced by the various stands taken by the two powers towards Venice. To Louis of Anjou the struggle against Serenissima was one facet of a grandiose policy targeting the hegemony of Hungary in Central and Eastern Europe, while to Genoa, the elimination of her great adversary was a critical objective of her external policy. The lines to follow will present the way in which the Hungarian-Genoese alliance was perceived by the Venetians and how the Adriatic Republic strove to counteract it.

The presentation of the Genoese-Hungarian collusion in the Venetian chronicles allows a parallel with the Genoese-Byzantine alliance concluded at Nymphaion almost one century before. Both alliances had an explicit anti-Venetian character, and they both hinged on the conjunction of a naval power (Genoa) with land powers in conflict with Venice. Moreover, both alliances struck areas of critical interests to the Venetians. In 1261 the colonial empire of Venice in Romania was put under question, while in the second half of the fifteenth century the Genoese-Hungarian alliance challenged the supremacy of Venice in the very Adriatic Sea.<sup>3</sup> Eventually, just like Byzantium had done at the end of the thirteenth century, Hungary sided with Genoa against Venice at a time when war had broken out between the two great maritime powers. However, if in 1294–1299 the emperor Andronicus II was arm-twisted into a war meant to oust of the Venetians from the Black Sea, in 1377–1381 Louis joined the Genoese of his own accord, with the crushing of Venice as a final target.

All this can explain why the Venetian historiography rendered the treaty of Nymphaion and the Hungarian-Genoese alliance in similar terms. To the Venetian chroniclers, the agreement of 1261 was concluded “*contra Deum et omnia jura*”<sup>4</sup> and had its origins in the Genoese envy of the “*traffichi e ricchezze che posedeva la nation veneta*”.<sup>5</sup> This seemed to be the reason that pushed the Genoese into an alliance with the schismatic Byzantine Emperor “*inimico di Santa Romana*

<sup>2</sup> Şerban Papacostea, *Un tournant de la politique génoise en mer Noire au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle: l'ouverture des routes continentales en direction de l'Europe Centrale*, in *Oriente e Occidente tra medioevo ed età moderna*. Studi in onore di Geo Pitarino, a cura di Laura Balletto, Genova, 1997, pp. 939–947, especially p. 943.

<sup>3</sup> Alain Ducellier, *Note sur les intérêts génois en mer Adriatique: le témoignage des archives ragusaines*, in *Oriente e Occidente...*, pp. 191–215 points out that, until the war of Chioggia, Genoa did not intend to dominate in the Adriatic but had an interest in hindering her rival in the area; Idem, *Perturbations et tentatives de reconversion en Adriatique à l'époque de la guerre de Chioggia: le cas de Raguse*, in “*Byzantinische Forschungen*”, 12, 1987, pp. 607–632, makes a discussion of the role of Ragusa in the anti-Venetian coalition of the war of 1377–1381 and notes that the enthusiasm of the Dalmatian town faded away in the summer of 1380, after the defeat of the Genoese at Chioggia (Ibidem, pp. 608–609). More notable seem to have been the pirate raids of the Ragusans against the Venetian ships transporting grain.

<sup>4</sup> The wording, belonging to Marino Sabudo the Elder, appears in his sequel to the Chronicle of Geoffroy of Villehardouin Robert Lee Wolff, *Hopf's So Called "Fragmentum" of Marino Sanudo Torsello*, in Idem, *Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople*, London, 1976, p. 152

<sup>5</sup> Gian Giacomo Caroldo, *Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Mss. it. VII, 128b (=7443)*, f. 233.

*Chiesa*".<sup>6</sup> The language used by the Venetian chroniclers speculates on the difference in attitude of the two Italian republics towards the crusade, the alliance between the two "pillars of Christendom" (France and Venice)<sup>7</sup> being played against the collusion between traitors and heretics (the Genoese and the Greeks). Part of this language can also be identified in the featuring of the Genoese-Hungarian alliance in the same Venetian chronicles, although the King of Hungary was a catholic, and not at all a schismatic emperor such as Michael Paleologus.

Therefore, ignoring deliberately the Dalmatian issue poisoning the Hungarian-Venetian relations since the 12th century, Raphayno of Caresini terms as inexplicable the anti-Venetian actions of Louis of Anjou. In order to underline the "aberrant" policy of the king, Caresini marks out his descent from an all too Christian line of kings of France, and not from Attila, *flagellum Dei*. The chronicler also mentions the great services rendered by Venice to Christianity in defending the seas from Turks and pirates.<sup>8</sup> To Caresini, by his alliance with Genoa, the King of Hungary had joined a people hated by God and the Christians, a people that had always lived by looting.<sup>9</sup> In his turn, Gian Giacomo Caroldo believes that the policy of Louis was a result of "*sua insatiabile ambizione di soggiogare tutta Italia, parendoli che lo Stato di Venetia gli fosse solo impedimento a tale suo desiderio*". The king would have resorted to the alliance with Genoa being aware that he could not defeat Venice without the backup of a corresponding maritime power.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the Venetian historiography tried to justify the policy of the leadership of the Republic by assimilating all the adversaries of Venice with the enemies of the Holy See and the righteous faith. All the Venetian chroniclers observed this paradigm, and their interpretations of the developments had this recurrent note.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>7</sup> For an analysis of the chronicle of Martino da Canal in this line of reasoning see Giorgio Cracco, *Il pensiero storico di fronte ai problemi del comune Veneziano*, in *La storiografia veneziana fino al secolo XVI. Aspetti e problemi*, a cura di Agostino Pertusi, Firenze, 1970, pp. 45–74. The study points to the effort of the chronicler to create the image of a Venice as the sole defender of the religious faith: "chi, se non Venezia, poteva essere la spada della fede e del papato?" (*Ibidem*, p. 62).

<sup>8</sup> Raphaynus de Caresinis, *Cronica aa. 1343–1388*, a cura di Ester Pastorello, "Rerum Italicarum Scriptores", XII/pars II, Bologna, 1923, p. 23: "Mirum, quod tantum regem, qui non ab Atyla flagello Dei, sed a christianissimis Francorum regibus traxit originem, immoderatus adeo amor abduxerit, ut per epistolas et nuntios invitet universas nationes ad praedam contra Venetos, qui, pro fide catholica, pro tuitione ac libertate universorum contra Turcos et piratas, proprijs sumptibus, mare custodiunt."

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 30: "<Louis of Anjou> adhaegerit nationi Deo et hominibus exosae, Ianuensibus videlicet, qui semper de rapto vixisse noscuntur."

<sup>10</sup> Gian Giacomo Caroldo, f. 887, Caroldo remarked that Louis, unable to crush Venice "senza le maritime forze però aspettavano che Genovesi all'ora potentissimi nel mare havessero caggione d'unirsi con loro contro Venetiani."

<sup>11</sup> One should also add that a new trend appeared in the Venetian historiography by the middle of the 14th century: the chroniclers became the spokesman of some aristocratic groups, see for instance Antonio Carile, *Aspetti della cronachistica veneziana nei secoli XIII<sup>e</sup> XIV*, in *La storiografia veneziana fino al secolo XVI. Aspetti e problemi*, a cura di Agostino Pertusi, Firenze, 1970, pp. 75–120, especially pp. 97–106. A break in this direction seems to have been made by the chronicle of Enrico Dandolo.

It was justly pointed out that the first Genoese-Hungarian attempt to undermine the commercial preponderance of Venice dates back to the second war of the Straits. In 1352, Genoa requested the diplomatic intercession of Louis of Anjou by the German Emperor Charles IV of Luxembourg, with the purpose to prohibit all contacts of the German merchants with Venice. The approach was successful and the emperor proclaimed a *devetum* that functioned until 1358.<sup>12</sup>

The Venetian chronicles confirm this point of view. According to Gian Giacomo Caroldo, at the beginning of the war of 1350–1355, the Venetians would have sent an embassy to Louis with the mission to prevent an alliance between the king of Hungary and the Genoese; the results of this approach were bitterly disappointing: the Venetian ambassador received “*da Sua Maesta buone parole senza risolutione alcuna*”.<sup>13</sup> Some time later, the Venetians got word of the disturbing war preparations of the king against Zara, with the prospects of the Dalmatian town deemed “*dubbiosa e pericolosa*”<sup>14</sup>. On 29 December 1352, Serenissima learned that an alliance had been settled between the Hungarians and the Genoese, and, in January 1353, a Hungarian embassy demanded the restoration of Dalmatia.<sup>15</sup>

The peace of 1355 between the Genoese and the Venetians did not remove the danger of the Genoese-Hungarian alliance; on the contrary, this threat became evermore serious after the beginning of the Hungarian-Venetian war over Dalmatia (1355–1358). A bone of contention in the relations between the two powers as early as the 12th century,<sup>16</sup> the Dalmatian coast had been claimed by Louis of Anjou in 1345–1348, when the king instigated the Dalmatian towns to revolt against Serenissima. The conflict was quenched by an eight-year amistice maintaining Dalmatia under Venetian rule.<sup>17</sup> In 1356 this truce expired, and had to

<sup>12</sup> S. Ljubić, *Listine. O odnosajih izmedju juznoga slavenstva i mletacke republike* (= *Monumenta spectantia historiam slavorum meridionalium*), IV, Zagreb, 1874, doc. XXV, p. 8: on 4 april 1359 Charles IV of Luxembourg announced the town of Augsburg “*cum pro amore illustrissimi principis domini Ludovici regis Hungariae fratris nostri dilecti inimitias gessimus contrariando civitati Venetiarum civibusque eiusdem civitatis et cum se mutuo nunc per concordiam composuerint, hinc est per nos predictam civitatem et cives Venetiarum cum eorum bonis gratiose resumpsimus in nostre tutelle deffensionem cesariam*”. Comments of the text in: Șerban Papacostea, *De la guerre du Bosphore...*, p. 344. See also Gyorgy Szekely, *Les facteurs économiques et politiques dans les rapports de la Hongrie et de Venise à l'époque de Sigismond*, in *Venezia e Ungheria nel Rinascimento*, Firenze, 1973, pp. 37–38.

<sup>13</sup> Gian Giacomo Caroldo, f. 463.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, f.478–480; the Venetians sent another embassy to the Hungarian Court and took measures for the defense of Zara.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, ff. 486–487; as a reaction the Venetians sent another embassy, including Marino Falier and Marco Cornaro, to request that Louis should give up his claims. The King was adamant about Venice having broken the peace with Hungary.

<sup>16</sup> For the antecedents of the Hungarian-Venetian conflict over Dalmatia see Ferenc Makk, *The Arpads and the Comneni. Political relations between Hungary and Byzantium in the 12th century*, Budapest, 1989, pp. 18–19, 21, 33, 46, 57.

<sup>17</sup> S. Ljubić, *Listine...*, III, pp. 314–321.

be renegotiated. Taking advantage of the exhaustion of Venice in the recently ended war with Genoa,<sup>18</sup> Louis “*sine aliqua belli suspicione*” and “*sine belli denuntiatione*” according to chronicler Lorenzo de Monacis, forced his way into Friuli and besieged Treviso, while another part of his army marched into Dalmatia and took the towns of Zara, Sebenico, Spalato, Trau and Nona.<sup>19</sup> In order to quickly defeat Venice, Louis secured himself the alliance of the Lord of Padova, Francesco of Carrara, of the Patriarch of Aquilea and of the Duke of Austria, and tried to obtain the support of Genoa by the intermediary of the Duke of Milan lord of the town at that time. Although the Hungarian-Genoese collaboration could not be achieved in 1356–1358,<sup>20</sup> the project outlined by Louis the Great during this conflict would be resumed at the outbreak of the war of 1377–1381.

Unable to strike back efficiently, Venice resorted to pontifical mediation. Carried out between 11 November 1356 and the beginning of April 1357 under the direction of the apostolic legate Peter of Thomas,<sup>21</sup> these negotiations led to no result owing to the inflexible stands of the two camps in the issues of Zara and of the damages claimed by the king of Hungary (100,000 florins). Therefore, on 9 April 1357 war broke out again and ended in the defeat of Serenissima. The treaty

<sup>18</sup> Laurentii de Monacis, *Chronicon de Rebus Venetis ab urbe condita ad annum MCCCLIV*, ed. Flaminio Cornelius, Venetia, 1758, p. 110: “Rex (...) sciens Venetos Januensi & Ligustico bello per quinquennium fatigatos”. This reason should not be ignored. However, there may have been other motives for Louis to have attacked Venice after announcing a campaign against Stephen Dusan, king of Serbia. Exactly in those years, Stephen Dusan had set his mind on improving his relations with the Papacy, declaring himself willing to turn Catholic and to launch a crusade against the Turks; even if this was rather a tactical move to check off the Hungarian pressure, and not in the least a real intention, the policy of the Serbian king yielded results. See Oscar Halecki, *Un empereur de Byzance à Rome. Vingt ans de travail pour l'Union des Eglises et pour la défense de l'empire d'Orient 1355–1375*, Warszawa, 1930, pp. 21–27; Frederick J. Boehlke, *Pierre de Thomas. Scholar, Diplomat and Crusader*, Philadelphia, 1966, pp. 80–93; George Christos Soulis, *The Serbs and Byzantium during the reign of tsar Stephen Dusan (1331–1355) and his successors*, Washington D.C., 1984, pp. 53–55.

<sup>19</sup> Lorenzo de Monacis, *Chronicon*, pp. 110–111; in order to divert the attention of the Venetians, Louis declared, in the midst of the preparations for the campaign, that he was planning an expedition against Serbia; the revolt of Zara, instigated by Louis, contributed to the success of the expedition. One of the Venetian chroniclers believed that the expenses incurred by the quenching of the eight revolts of Zara exceeded by far the value of the fortress; however, the chronicler's preoccupation with the Dalmatian issue indicates that he belonged to the “mercantile group” that identified the prosperity of the State with “*la fortuna dei traffici*”. In the 14th century, the Venetian aristocracy was divided in two major groups, one advocating the defense of the local interests and a better correlation with the economy and the policy of *Terraferma*, and another who advocated the maintaining of the relations with the eastern territories see Silvana Collodo, *Tem e caratteri della cronachistica veneziana in volgare del tre-quattrocento (Enrico Dandolo)*, in “Studi Veneziani”, 9, 1967, pp. 127–151.

<sup>20</sup> Gian Giacomo Caroldo, f. 590 noted that the Duke of Milan, Galeazzo II Visconti had informed the Venetians about the intentions of the king of Hungary; Frederick J. Boehlke, *Pierre de Thomas...*, p. 106 lists the Duke of Milan among the members of the anti-Venetian alliance.

<sup>21</sup> A detailed account in Frederick J. Boehlke, *Pierre de Thomas*, pp. 104–128.

of Zara (18 February 1358) sanctioned the coming of the Dalmatian coast under Hungarian authority.

The victory of Louis in this war, as well as his victories against the Golden Horde, brought forth the establishment of a commercial link between the Black Sea and the Adriatic by way of the Transylvanian towns of Sibiu (Hermannstadt) and Braşov (Kronstadt).<sup>22</sup> In order to encourage the commercial traffic on this new route, Louis granted important privileges to the towns of Bratislava (1361), Sibiu (1367, 1370)<sup>23</sup> and Braşov (1370)<sup>24</sup> and, by the close of 1370, to all the merchants in the kingdom of Hungary.<sup>25</sup> According to Zsigmond Pach,<sup>26</sup> the king tried to make of Zara an anti-Venice, but these attempts ended in failure, for despite all the privileges he had granted, Louis was unable to ensure the necessary abundance in eastern commodities. Painfully aware of the peril of the Hungarian rule over Dalmatia, Venice did everything to prevent the Levant products from reaching the Dalmatian coast otherwise than through the hands of the Venetian merchants. In the opinion of Pach, Louis' failure was equally attributable to the fact that the interests of the king were hardly in tune with the interests of the Transylvanian merchants who preferred Central Europe to the Dalmatian coast.<sup>27</sup>

The anti-Venetian efforts of Louis the Great went beyond the scope of commercial measures. As early as the outbreak of the conflict of 1356–1358, and some time after, the king of Hungary tried on the one hand to isolate the city of saint Mark and on the other hand to gather all the enemies of the Republic. In contradistinction with the commercial aspects of the policy of the king, this vast project to create a political and military bloc has still a number of unanswered questions, both given the scarcity of documents and the sinuous character of the external policy of Louis. The general traits of this project can nevertheless be outlined: the use of the Dalmatian ports as a base of anti-Venetian operations in

<sup>22</sup> Şerban Papacostea, *De la guerre du Bosphore...*, pp. 342–343.

<sup>23</sup> *Documenta Romaniae Historica C*, vol XIII, doc. 242, pp. 400–401 and doc. 565, pp. 834–835.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*, doc. 546, p. 817.

<sup>25</sup> Şerban Papacostea, *De la guerre du Bosphore...*, p. 343.

<sup>26</sup> Zsigmond Pal Pach, *La politica commerciale di Luigi d'Angio e il traffico delle "mercanzie marittime" dopo la pace di Zara*, in "Rapporti veneto-ungheresi all'epoca del Rinascimento", Budapest, 1975, pp. 105–119. The author concludes that the policy of Louis eventually ended in failure: "Di conseguenza, ben difficilmente potevano avere la possibilità di assicurare l'abbondanza delle mercanzie marittime all'Ungheria – come era nelle intenzioni di re Luigi – né direttamente, né per il tramite dei commercianti di Presburgo, Szeben e Brasso, né assicurando le vie libere ai genovesi" (p. 114); *Idem*, *La route du poivre vers la Hongrie médiévale (Contribution à l'histoire du commerce méditerranéen au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle)*, in "Mélanges en l'honneur de Fernand Braudel", I, 1973, Toulouse, p. 450: despite Louis's efforts the Dalmatian-Hungarian trade route was short-lived; *Idem*, *Le commerce du Levant et la Hongrie au Moyen Age*, "Annales E.S.C.", 31, 1976, 6, pp. 1176–1194; *Idem*, *Levant trade routes and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages*, in "XV<sup>e</sup> Congrès International des sciences historiques, Bucarest 10–17 août 1980", Rapports, II, Bucarest, 1980, pp. 222–230.

<sup>27</sup> Z.P. Pach, *La politica comercial...*, p. 117

the Adriatic, the building of a war fleet, the bringing of the Patriarch of Aquileia under obedience to the Hungarian Church, the military support offered to Venice's adversaries in Italy and elsewhere, and the instigation of a new Genoese-Venetian conflict.

The conquest of Dalmatia opened the possibility to use the Dalmatian ports as bases of operation against Serenissima. Louis the Great hoped that the towns of Zara and Ragusa would compete against Venice in the Adriatic, and assisted them in making direct contacts with the East.<sup>28</sup> According to a document of 1381, the king wished that "*buccas fluminum Gulfi ad se spectare et pertinere; et quod sibi et suis subditis licebat libere et impune ad dictas buccas, et in eis navigare, intrare et exire, imittere et exportare sal et alias quascumque merces pro sue libito voluntatis, sicut et quemadmodum in aliis partibus dicti Gulfi habet*".<sup>29</sup>

The challenge of the supremacy of Venice raised by the Dalmatian towns was only aggravated by a clause in the Venetian-Genoese treaty of 1355, which allowed the Ligur merchants to navigate, with commercial purposes in "*gulfum domini ducis et communis Veneciarum*".<sup>30</sup> As previously noted, this stipulation was benign as long as "*la loi de fer imposée par Venise au commerce de la région conservait sa force, mais qui pouvait s'avérer catastrophique dans le cas où une puissance continentale de taille (...) se serait emparée d'une partie du littoral de cette mer*".<sup>31</sup> In fact, the conjunction of Genoa and the kingdom of Hungary in the Adriatic lay at the core of the strategy of the anti-Venetian coalition in the war of Chioggia, the purpose being to isolate and block the city of the lagoons.

The attempt by Louis to create a fleet with the help of Genoa was closely linked to the occupation of Dalmatia<sup>32</sup>. In January 1365, the alarming news that "*in partibus Nicie et Provincie*" the King of Hungary was arming ten galleys for unknown purposes (*ad quem finem nescimus*)<sup>33</sup> reached Venice. The Senate instructed Raphayno de Caresini to probe for the intentions of Louis<sup>34</sup>; in the

<sup>28</sup> Ş. Papacostea, *De la guerre du Bosphore...*, pp. 345–346 through the mediation of Louis, Ragusa obtained a pontifical leave to trade with the Turkish emirates; the study points out to several economic measures meant to deal a blow at the interests of Venice: the imposition of the right of compulsory deposit for the Venetian merchants and the right granted by the Venetians to the Ragusans to trade with foreign merchants on the Venetian markets. Despite all these measures, Venice survived the trial because Ragusa and other Dalmatian towns were far more dependent on the Venetian market than Venice was on the Balkan ones see Barisa Krekici, *Mleci i unutrastnost Balkana u cetmaestom veku*, "Zbornik Radova Vizantoloskog Instituta", 21, 1982, pp. 14–158.

<sup>29</sup> S. Ljubić, *Listine...*, IV, doc. CCXLI, p. 123.

<sup>30</sup> *Liber jurium Reipublicae Genuensis*, II, ed. E. Ricotti, Torino, 1867, col. 624.

<sup>31</sup> Şerban Papacostea, *De la guerre du Bosphore...*, p. 344.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 344: the Genoese Baldassare da Sorba and Simone Doria held, one after the other, the position of admiral of the Hungarian kingdom.

<sup>33</sup> S. Ljubić, *Listine...*, IV, doc. 132, p. 76

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*.

meantime, an embassy was dispatched to Queen Joanna of Naples (who, as Countess of Provence was directly involved in the issue) to request that the building of galleys that "*possunt leviter venire ad damnum nostrum*" should be put to a hold. Venice reminded the queen that, when Louis the Great had started war against Naples, "*Nolumus sibi favere ullo modo, sed cum nostris galeis id turbavimus toto posse*".<sup>35</sup> The Venetian messenger was to ask for reassurance that "*nullo modo dicte galee vel aliqua earum aut similes galee armentur in dictis partibus vel alis locis subditis excellentie sue*". In case the queen refused to grant the request, the ambassador was to point out that if the ships in question should cause any damage to the Venetians, Serenissima would be entitled to make retaliation.<sup>36</sup>

The outcome of the matter is unclear. In fact, this project of Louis may not have lived long enough to be put into practice. However, the promptness of the Venetians' reactio suggests that the building of a war fleet by the Hungarian king was perceived as a deadly threat. Even if the Angevine's intentions remained unknown to Venice, the probability that these galleys would be used against Venice had to be taken into account.

The attempt of Louis of Anjou to subordinate to his kingdom the Church of Aquilea can be ascribed to the same anti-Venetian effort. The Venetian response was prompt as ever. Hearing that the king had asked the Pope "*quod idem patriarcha Aquilegiensis posset sibi concedere sub annuo censu Istriam, offerens dare sibi ultra quam alii dent*",<sup>37</sup> the Doge Lorenzo Celsi sent an embassy to the Patriarch of Aquilea to point out that the putting into practice of such a project "*esset destructio ecclesie Aquilegiensis, et modus reducendi eam in servitutem, et modus etiam perdendi totum quod ipsa ecclesia tenet et etiam esset periculo summo quantum esse potest statui nostro*".<sup>38</sup> The subordination of the patriarch of Aquilea by the Hungarian kingdom have indeed posed a serious peril to Venice by the establishment of an outpost of Louis of Anjou in Friuli. One should also consider the symbolic structuring of this project, especially as the bishopric of Aquilea, according to a legend, had been created by Saint Mark<sup>39</sup>. As a result, the possible fall of this bishopric into dependency

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, doc. 134, pp. 77–78; the accreditation was handed into the messenger on 24 January 1365.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*: "quod si galee predictae armabuntur ut est dictum, et nobis vel navigiis aut terris et fidelibus nostris aliquod facient damnum, quoquo modo providebimus et providere intendimus illis remediis, que convenient saluti et bono nostro, nec possemus talia ullatenus tollerare".

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*, doc. 112, pp. 64–65, 11 March 1364; the Venetians had learned that the Pope, avoiding to give an answer, had advised the king that he wished to get better informed.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>39</sup> Martino Da Canal, *Les Estoires de Venise. Cronaca veneziana in lingua francese dalle origini al 1275*, a cura di Alberto Limentani, Firenze, 1972, p. 340.



to Hungarian church would have dealt a serious blow to the prestige of Serenissima.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, one should include in this vast anti-Venetian project the false rumors put about the outbreak of a new Genoese-Venetian conflict<sup>41</sup> and the attack of the Venetians ships by dalmatian pirates.<sup>42</sup>

All these aspects of the Angevine policy show that the conquest of Dalmatia did not mark the end of the struggle between Louis of Anjou and Venice. The reopening of the conflict was postponed until 1377 only due to the extent of the royal projects, and the Genoese-Venetian peace being maintained until that year.

Throughout this time, Venice was aware that the king of Hungary was a fearful enemy and tried to counteract his measures. The defeat suffered in the war over Dalmatia was however a serious blow and Serenissima felt compelled to assume a defensive attitude in the relations to Hungary, which only aggravated her position in time. There may have also been the hope to get the king interested in the anti-Ottoman crusade, which would have removed the danger from the Venetian borders. It is the only reasonable explanation for the favorable answer of the Venetians to the request of Louis to support the Hungarian crusade with ships, at a time when similar requests from the King of Cyprus or the Count of Savoy had been politely but nonetheless flatly denied. Despite these hopes and the negotiations carried through in the 60's of the 14th century by Louis with the Papacy, Amedeo of Savoy, Venice or Byzantium, the crusades of the time (the sack of Alexandria by Peter of Lusignan or the conquest of Gallipoli by Amedeo of Savoy) took place without Hungarian involvement. According to the Venetian Emanuele Piloti this was due to the conflict of Louis of Anjou with Serenissima, for, "*nesun ne peut faire aulcune chose de conte, faillant l'ayde et la puissance de la Segnorie de Venise par la voye de la mer, de faire de très grans faits contre les Turcs*",<sup>43</sup> and perhaps, as noted by Maria Holban, to the fact that the interests of the king were oriented in quite different directions.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>40</sup> One should mention the yealy tribute owed by the Patriarch of Aquilea to Venice: twelve giant loaves of bread and twelve pigs, see Martino Da Canal, *Les Estoires...*, p. 9; twelve other pigs were slain before the Doge during the carnival and a German traveller of the 14th century, Arnolf von Harff, learned from a Venetian that the episode was meant to keep vivid in mind the past defeat of the Patriarch of Aquilea by Venice. For an analysis of the text see Peter Burke, *The carnival of Venice*, in Idem, *The Historical Antropology of Early Moddern Italy. Essays on Perception and Communication*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 184.

<sup>41</sup> S. Ljubici, *Listine...*, IV, doc. 135, p. 78.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*, doc. 136, p. 79.

<sup>43</sup> *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti sur le Passage en Terre Sainte (1420)*, published by Pierre Herman Dopp, Louvain-Paris, 1958, p. 9; it is true that Piloti had in mind the situation existing in the time of Sigismund of Luxembourg, but the assertion can also be considered valid for the reign of Louis of Anjou seeing that the essential cause of the conflict was the Dalmatian coast.

<sup>44</sup> Maria Holban, *Contribuții la studiul raporturilor dintre Țara Românească și Ungaria Angevină (Rolul lui Benedict Himfy în legătură cu problema Vidinului)*, in Eadem, *Din cronica relațiilor româno-ungare în sec. XIII–XIV*, Bucharest, 1981, p. 164.

## 2. The Ottoman rise, the crusade projects of Louis of Anjou and the Venetian response

The conquest of Gallipolis by Suleyman, the son of Emir Orhan, is regarded in historiography as a crucial moment of the Ottoman expansion in Europe.<sup>45</sup> One should add to this event the conquest by the Ottomans of the Emirate of Karasi, which gave access to the Aegean Sea and, implicitly, the possibility to intensify naval raids especially against Tracia.<sup>46</sup> The danger posed to the Venetians was all the more serious as, in the Genoese-Venetian war of 1350–1355, the Genoese had created by their alliance with Orhan a counterbalance to the Byzantine-Venetian alliance.<sup>47</sup>

The Christian powers seemed not to be aware of the importance of these events. In the third decade of the century, only Venice showed an interest in maintaining a fleet to patrol the Aegean Sea, while the Order of the Hospitallers and the kingdom of Cyprus, with the concurrence of the Pontifical legate Pierre de Thomas, refocused their attention first on the south of Anatolia, then on the mameluke Egypt. Under these circumstances, the dissolving of the naval league created in the fourth decade of the 14th century became a *fait accompli* at the end of 1360.<sup>48</sup> In the same year, Serenissima seemed preoccupied with the actions of the Emir of Sinope, Celebi, who was arming galleys in the Black Sea and showing hostile intentions. As a consequence, the Captain of the Gulf received instructions to proceed with four galleys in the direction of Constantinople in order to discuss

<sup>45</sup> Peter Charanis, *On the date of the occupation of Gallipoli by the Turks*, "Byzantinoslavica", 16, 1955, 1, pp. 113–117 who dates the event to March 1354 and refutes the hypothesis of G.G. Arnakis, *Gregory Palamas among the Turks and Documents of his Captivity as Historical Sources*, "Speculum", 26, 1951, pp. 104–118, who pleaded for 1355. Another historian who rallied to the point of view expressed by Charanis was John Meyendorff, *Grecks, Turcs et Juifs en Asie Mineure au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle (en appendice: la date de la prise de Gallipoli)*, "Byzantinische Forschungen", 1, 1966, pp. 216–217. See also Kate Fleet, *Early Turkish Naval Activities*, "Oriente Moderno", XX(LXXXI), 2001, 1, pp.135–137.

<sup>46</sup> Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade. Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)*, Venice, 1983, p. 64.

<sup>47</sup> For the circumstances of the Genoese-Ottoman agreement see Michel Balard, *A propos de la bataille du Bosphore. L'expédition génoise de Paganino Doria à Constantinople (1351–1352)*, "Travaux et Mémoires", p. 449.

<sup>48</sup> The Venetian Senate had requested in March 1360 to the papal legate the right to use the ships with which Serenissima had joined the Holy League in an action against the emir of Sinope Freddy Thiriet, *Régestes...*, I, doc. 360, p. 95; for the relations of this emir of Sinope with the Italian maritime powers see Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Gazi Celebi of Sinope*, in *Oriente e Occidente tra medioevo ed età moderna*. *Studi in onore di Geo Pitarino*, a cura di Laura Balletto, II, Genova, 1997, pp. 1271–1275. On 19 October 1360 the Venetians found out that Peter of Thomas had disarmed the pontifical galley and two other ships belonging to the Hospitallers. Thus only one galley had been left to fight against the Turks, namely the galley of Crete see F. Thiriet, *Régestes...*, I, doc. 367, p. 97; Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade...*, p. 67.

with the bailo the measures to be taken. The Senate suggested some common action with the Byzantines and the Genoese<sup>49</sup>.

This suggestion was reiterated in 1363, when an embassy sent out to Constantinople to settle various aspects of the relations of the Republic with Byzantium was commissioned to discuss the creation of a naval Byzantine-Venetian-Genoese alliance directed this time against the Ottomans<sup>50</sup>. The league was to have a validity of two years, count eight galleys (of which four Byzantine, two Genoese and two Venetians) so as to sever the links between the Ottomans and their possessions in Europe<sup>51</sup>. The leadership was to be exerted alternately by the Italian Republics, or by John V Palaeologus exclusively in case the *basileus* intended to participate in the expedition.

This project did not live through the negotiation stage, being undermined from the beginning by the dispute concerning the island of Tenedos. To Venice, the possession of the island was a *sine qua non* issue for settling an alliance against the Turks, while Genoa considered it unthinkable that the Venetians should get hold of a place from where they could easily block the Straits. The extremely complicated situation in the Levant also made the project impossible. As noted by Freddy Thiriet, the settling of an alliance hinged on the existence of good relations between Venice and Genoa, between the two Italian cities and Byzantium as well as between the two Republics and their colonies. Or, in 1363, none of these conditions was met.<sup>52</sup>

The failure of these negotiations and especially the outbreak of the revolt in Crete interrupted the preoccupation of Venice with the crusade exactly at a time when western powers seemed willing to offer their support to the Christians in the Levant. Under these new circumstances of 1365–1366, the appeals to Venice to participate in a crusade made by the Pope, Peter of Lusignan or Amedeo of Savoy<sup>53</sup> were rejected one after another. Quite surprisingly, a similar request

<sup>49</sup> F. Thiriet, *Régestes...*, I, doc. 360, p. 95.

<sup>50</sup> F. Thiriet, *Una proposta di lega antiturca tra Venezia, Genova e Bisanzio nel 1363*. "Archivio Storico Italiano", 113, 1955, 3, pp. 321–334.

<sup>51</sup> It is for the first time that this strategic idea, a cornerstone for the crusades of Nicopolis and Varna, is formulated. It would reappear three years later, during the negotiations of Louis of Anjou with Venice when the Venetian fleet was intended to act "ad partes Satalie et ad bucham ad turbandum quod Turchi non possent descendere de partibus Grecie supra Turchiam" see S. Ijubić, *Listine...*, IV, doc. CXLVIII, pp.85–86.

<sup>52</sup> F. Thiriet, *Una proposta di lega antiturca tra Venezia, Genova e Bisanzio nel 1363*, "Archivio Storico Italiano", 113, 1955, 3, p. 326.

<sup>53</sup> According to the chronicle of Caroldo (Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, mss. it. VII, 128b=7443, pp. 730–731), Amedeo requested Venice to arm five galleys and two *fustae*. In exchange for this, he was placing himself at the orders of the Republic, once John V was free to return to Constantinople. Venice seems to have refused the request politely, fearing some action against the Mameluke Egypt and only got involved only when it became obvious that the expedition had other targets; for the negotiations between Amedeo and Venice see Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, I, Philadelphia, 1976, pp. 291–294.

formulated by the King of Hungary was received favourably by the leadership of the Republic. Which is all more puzzling, as the Angevine's crusade project was well inscribed in the general picture of the crusade contemplated by the Papacy in 1365–1366.<sup>54</sup>

In 1360–1361, the successes in Asia Minor of Peter of Lusignan, as well as the conquest of Vidin by Hungary rekindled the expectations in an expedition to relieve the Christians from Moslem pressure. With this objective in mind the King of Cyprus started on a journey including the most important courts of Europe, asking for support,<sup>55</sup> imitated by the emperor John V who headed for Buda in order to determine Louis of Hungary to launch an attack against the Turks<sup>56</sup>. On 18 April 1365, Pope Urban V was rather optimistic about the prospects of an action against the infidels, with the participation of the Hospitallers, the Marquis of Montferrat and the Genoese<sup>57</sup>. On January 1366, another letter by the Pope announced confidently that the armies of Louis of Anjou were approaching Byzantium on land, while Peter of Lusignan and Amedeo of Savoy on sea<sup>58</sup>.

This was the background for the negotiations of Venice with the King of Hungary whose beginnings are placed in 1356.<sup>59</sup> A topic in the negotiations carried on by the two parties during that year, with the purpose to quench the struggle over Dalmatia, was Venice's obligation to arm two galleys, so that the king might go on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and fight against the Turks and the Saracens (*ad sepulcrum domini vel contra Turcos aut Saracenos*). The galleys were to be used as long as the Venetian-Hungarian peace was observed (*per illud tempus quod fuerimus concordēs*)<sup>60</sup>. Interrupted by the outbreak of Hungarian-Venetian war,

<sup>54</sup> Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy...*, pp. 287–289; for the crusade of Louis of Anjou see Norman Housley, *King Louis the Great of Hungary and the Crusades (1342–1382)*, "The Slavonic and East European Review", 62, 1984, 2, pp. 192–208.

<sup>55</sup> Peter of Lusignan's "tour" included Rhodes, Venice, Genoa, Avignon (where he also had talks with the King of France John the Good), England, Prague and Cracow. In the capital of Poland, Peter of Lusignan carried out negotiations with the German Emperor Charles of Luxembourg, the King of Hungary and the King of Poland, see Malgorzata Dabrowska, *Peter of Cyprus and Casimir the Great in Cracow*, in "Byzantiaka", 14, 1994, pp. 257–267.

<sup>56</sup> J. Gill, *John V Palaeologus at the Court of Louis I of Hungary (1366)*, "Byzantinoslavica", 38, 1977, 1, pp. 31–38.

<sup>57</sup> *Acta Urbani Pp. V (1362–1370)*, ed. Aloysius Tăutu, Vatican, 1964, doc. 74, p. 122–123: "certam unionem quorundam fidelium cum apparatus galearum et armigerarum gentium". The Pope's letter was addressed to John V Palaeologus.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*, doc. 90, pp. 148–149; Kenneth M. Seton, *The Papacy...*, I, p. 287.

<sup>59</sup> Freddy Thiriet, *Regestes des délibérations du Senat de Venise concernant la Roumanie. I (1329–1399)*, Paris-La Haye, 1958, I, doc. 630, p. 237.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem*. It is unclear whether the Turks mentioned in the document were the Ottomans. As a matter of fact there is little reason to believe that the king intended to go on a crusade to Jerusalem. This target may have been mentioned only for the ears of the pontifical legate Pierre of Thomas. Documents posterior to 1356 suggest that Louis was far more interested in checking off the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans.

these negotiations would be resumed ten years later. This time, the king's intentions seemed to be better defined. Louis requested that 2 to 5 galleys should be armed at his own expense, over a period of six months, so that he may go in person "*cum magno exercitu per terram et per mare in subsidium imperii Romaniae contra Turchos et quod istud erat de requisitione et beneplacito domini imperatoris Constantinopolis*".<sup>61</sup> Venice not only responded favourably to the request of the king, but also offered to arm the galleys for six months at her own expense. The only condition was that the King Louis should not use the galleys against Byzantium or against the emirs of Teologo (Aydin) and Palatia (Menteshe) to whom Venice was bound by peace treaties<sup>62</sup>.

The attitude of Serenissima may have sprung from political calculus. The Venetians must have believed that a positive answer to the king would enable them to follow closely his moves, while a refusal could spark a new conflict<sup>63</sup>. The fear caused by Louis was doubled by an apprehension about the target of the expedition of Amedeo of Savoy. The participation of the Genoese and Provençal vessels in the crusade of the "Green Count" determined the leadership of Serenissima to request their representatives in Romania to take special safety measures<sup>64</sup>. At the same time, Venice was concerned about the objective of the enterprise. The sack of Alexandria in 1365 by Peter of Lusignan had caused damage to the Venetian trade and frozen all diplomatic relations with the Sultan

<sup>61</sup> S. Ljubić, *Listine...*, IV, doc. CLXVIII, pp. 85–86. The document is an example of "Machiavellism" on both parts. Louis pretended to have renounced his project of a crusade in the Holy Land or Egypt for fear of causing damage to the Venetian trade. On the other hand, the Venetians showered Louis with gratitude for his concern about the interests of the Republic, "*quod regia maiestas tamquam bene disposita ad honorem et statum nostrum expresse dederat in mandatis omnibus terris et locis suis quod cives et mercatores Venetiarum bene et favorabiliter tractarentur, de quo regratiamur ut plurimum sue maiestati, cognoscentes per effectum bonam et sinceram dispositionem suam erga nos et nostros*". The sincerity of these thanks can be measured in the advice to ambassador Leonardo Dandolo, encouraged to utter additional words of praise and gratitude "*que tibi utilia videbuntur*".

<sup>62</sup> *Ibidem*; this suggests that Venice did not trust the King of Hungary. As noted with good reason by Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy...*, I, p. 288: "*Apparently, the Venetian government suspected Louis's intentions on the Bosphorus, and someone in the Senate must have observed that, if the poor Greeks were going to have the Hungarians as allies, they would not need the Turks as enemies*". For the negotiations between Louis and Venice see also Oscar Halecki, *Un empereur de Byzance à Rome...*, pp. 114–116.

<sup>63</sup> One should also reckon with the Venetians' fear that the king would take refusal as good ground for launching a new conflict.

<sup>64</sup> F. Thiriet, *Regestes...*, I, doc. 435–436: the bailo of Negroponte was required to arm the galley of the island that was to escort the convoy from Romania to the Bosphorus, together with the vessels of the Captain of the Gulf; two days after the conquest of Gallipolis by the Count of Savoy, the Senate commissioned the bailo of Constantinople to take all necessary steps for the protection of the Venetian ships and merchants, since the presence of the Genoese galleys in the fleet of Amedeo was perceived as a potential threat.

of Cairo. In 1366, the Republic suspected that the target of the crusade of the Count of Savoy was again Egypt<sup>65</sup>.

The prudence shown by Venice in all these circumstances was amply justified, considering that despite her commitments<sup>66</sup>, Hungary did not get involved in the crusade of Amedeo of Savoy. Although on 24 July 1366 Louis commended Doge Marco Corner for his naval assistance and inquired about the place where his forces were to make junction with the fleet<sup>67</sup>, two months later the king expressed his concerns about the expenses incurred by Venice with the arming of the fleet and the maintaining of the Republic's good relations with the Turkish emirates. One may infer that the latter document was but a pretext invoked by Louis to justify his lack of involvement in the crusade of the "Green Count" who on 23 August 1366 had occupied Gallipoli.

The failure to launch the Hungarian crusade made Venice reluctant to involve herself in any similar projects. The relations with Louis of Anjou became strained<sup>68</sup> and the Republic showed an interest in settling an agreement with the Ottomans. This opportunity seems to have appeared in April 1368, when the Senate learned from Orio Pasqualigo, the former bailo of Constantinople, that emir Murad wished to grant Venetians "*quehdam locum ad velle nostrum in partibus Turchie*".<sup>69</sup> The Venetians were willing to accept the proposal and wanted to settle down at Scutari.<sup>70</sup> However,

<sup>65</sup> Only in June 1366 the Republic of Saint Mark was convinced that Amedeo would not target the Mameluke territories, see Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy...*, I, p. 294.

<sup>66</sup> According to the chronicle of Jehan Servion, *Geste et Chroniques de la Mayson de Savoye*, II, Turin, 1879, p. 125 Amedeo had sent an embassy to Louis to inform him that in May 1366 he would be in Gallipoli, asking the King "que en ce temps il se treuve la car a layde Dieu & la sienne nous donrons secours a l'empereur <=John Palaeologus> & au pays". After the *basileus* had been set free, the Count of Savoy seems to have declared that "se le roi Andrieu (sic!) de Hongrie fut venus per terre pour vous secourir, comme il mavoit mandez par son chivalier, lui & moy eussions pris telle vengeance des outrages fais a vous qui en fut perpetuelle memoire & non obstant quil ne soit pas venus, a layde de Dieu iay tant fait que estes hors de prison."

<sup>67</sup> S. Ljubić, *Listine...*, IV, doc. CXLIX, pp. 86–87: "eandem scire desiderantes, quod tempore, quo galeas ipsas habere debebimus et de loco ad quem ire debeant, volumus vos per litteras vel nuntios debito tempore reddere certiones."

<sup>68</sup> The reconfirmation by the king of the privilege for the trade of Sibiu (Hermannstadt) with Zara mentions the conflict with Venice of 1356–1358 in the following terms "...partes regni nostri Dalmacie et Croacie, quas a tyrannicis nostrorum emulorum manibus do auxiliante, recuperando, sub nostra reduximus fidelitate, pleno iure". (DRH C. vol. XIII, doc. 565, pp. 834–835)

<sup>69</sup> As suggested by the document the initiative of a Venetian-Ottoman treaty belonged to the Ottomans. Gh. I. Brătianu, *Les Vénitiens dans la mer Noire au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle après la deuxième guerre des Détroits*, "Echos d'Orient", 37, 1974, 174, p. 158 links the negotiations with the expedition of Amedeo of Savoy; Murad I had an interest in talking the Venetians out of the crusade. G. Brătianu believed that these negotiations were more liable to explain the reserves shown by Serenissima towards Hungary proposals and refusal to take possession of Gallipolis.

<sup>70</sup> Settlement on the Bosphorus, facing Constantinople see Freddy Thiriet, *Régestes...*, I, p. 118; the identification was also made by G. Brătianu, *Les Vénitiens...*, p. 156 who believed that, in that way, Venice intended to compete with Genoese Pera.

they requested the privilege to carry on their activities “*sine aliquando datio vel commercio persolvendo intrando quam exeundo et tam emendo quam vendendo*” and permission to fortify the place, so that the merchants could see about their trades in full safety.<sup>71</sup>

This project may have never been put into practice. The available information about the Venetian-Ottoman contacts in this period is extremely summary and vague. It seems that the periods of tension alternated with attempts to settle an alliance. Therefore, in July 1374 various reports from Romania pointed out that John V and Murad I were arming war ships liable to endanger the Venetian convoy from Romania. The Captain of the Gulf, Pietro Mocenigo, was instructed to send one of his best ships to Tenedos and even beyond this point, in order to get accurate information about these preparations.<sup>72</sup> After this episode, there is evidence about a new attempt to settle an alliance. A Venetian fleet sent in the Straits to compel John V Palaeologus to accept the signing of an agreement was instructed, in case of failure, to contact Murad I in order to revive the project of 1368.<sup>73</sup> Although the Byzantine emperor accepted the Venetian terms, a link between Serenissima and the Ottomans may have been established, if one accepts that “Radano”, prince of “Unfaithful Bulgaria” to whom the Venetians seem to have sent 10,000 armours in 1377, was in fact Murad I.<sup>74</sup>

In this line of reasoning, one may assert that before the outbreak of the war of Chioggia, the Ottoman had made a spectacular switch from the Genoese camp into the Venetian one. This overturn could be explained by the Hungarian-Genoese alliance and by the clashes of Louis of Anjou with Murad I, suggested in the Wallachian documents from 1370–1371. Confronted with a large coalition, Venice may have sought to reach an agreement with the Ottomans in order to secure her positions in the Levant. It is clear fact that in 1376–1377 Serenissima showed herself less concerned about the progress of the Turks into Europe than about the steady deterioration with her relations with Hungary and Genoa.

<sup>71</sup> S. Ljubić, *Listine...*, IV, doc. CLXV, pp. 92–93. The former counselors at Constantinople, Pietro Permarino and Marco Zeno confirmed the information; see F. Thiriet, *Régestes...*, I, doc. 461, p. 118.

<sup>72</sup> F. Thiriet, *Régestes...*, I, doc. 541, p. 134.

<sup>73</sup> Oscar Halecki, *Un empereur de Byzance...*, p. 321.

<sup>74</sup> This identification is advocated by Balint Homan, *Gli Angioini di Napoli in Ungheria, 1290–1403*, Roma, 1938, pp. 566–567; Gheorghe I. Brătianu, *L'expédition de Louis Ier de Hongrie contre le prince de Valachie Radu Ier Basarab en 1377*, in RHSEE, II, 1925, pp. 73–82 and Idem, *Les rois de Hongrie et les Principautés Roumaines au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, in BSHAR, XXVIII, 1947, pp. 26–29, proposed the identification Radano=Radu I, prince of Wallachia. In relation to his hypothesis the question arises why Louis referred to Radu I as “prince of Bulgaria” when he was only the prince of Wallachia, “terra nostra Transalpina” in Hungarian documents. The only answer would be a temporary rule of Radu I over Vidin, but such a hypothesis was rejected by Maria Holban, *Peut-il être question d'une seconde occupation roumaine de Vidin par Radu I<sup>er</sup> suivant de près celle de Vladislav Ier de l'année 1369 ?* RESEE, 18, 1980, 3, pp. 443–457.

### Conclusions

Venice reacted differently to the rise of Hungary and of the Ottomans. While in the first half of the 14th century the Republic of Saint Mark had been the main supporter of the crusade against the Turkish emirates, in the second half of the century her eyes were riveted on the rise of Angevine Hungary and the Hungarian-Genoese collaboration. Confronted with many problems of internal and external policy, Venice was not in a position to lead an aggressive policy or to counterbalance the alliance settled by Louis of Anjou with Genoa. Therefore, the problems left unsettled by the Venetian-Genoese war of 1350–1355 became more acute in time in such a way that, at the beginning of the war of Chioggia, Serenissima was practically left alone in front of a large coalition. The artisan of this coalition was Louis of Hungary who through political actions and commercial measures had steadily pursued a gradual encircling of Venice.

Although the circumstances in which the conflict broke out were totally unfavourable to them, the Venetians accepted the war, because *“di difendere o incrementare i traffici non doveva essere lecito a nessuno mettere in dubbio la potesta e arbitrio veneziano sui commerci orientali”*.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Anonymous chronicle, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, mss. it. cl. VII (=559), f. 6 recto; this assertion is all more significant as, somewhere above, peace is deemed preferable, since *“e meio romagnir con pocho danno che guastase lo stado loro et vogliando signorizare molte contrade.”*